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[8. F. No. 16724. In 'Bank. Dee. 26, 1944.] 
MA YNARD GARRISON, as Insurance Commissioner, ete., 
Appellant, v. EDWARD BROWN AND SONS (a Cor-
poration), Respondent. 
[1] Set-oif-Mutuality-Oapacity of pa.nies.-A fiduciary cannot 
set off claims owed him in his personal capacity against obli-
gations that he assumes as a trustee. . 
[2] Insurance -Insolvency - Actions by Liquidator - Oounter· 
claims.-In an action by the liquidator of an insurance com-
pany against an agent for premiums. collected, the agent, if 
a trustee of premiums collected, is entitled to a deduction of 
commissions earued as provided in the agency agreement, but 
he may not set off claims owing to him in his personal capacity, 
as to which he must seek satisfaction from tbe insolvent estate 
as a general creditor. . 
[Sa-3c] Oontracts-Actions-Findings-ModiAcation. -In an ac-
tion against an insurance agent for premiums collected, a find-
ing that subsequent to tbe original agency agreement providing 
for a trust relation as to collections, the relationship was modi-
fied to that of a debtor and creditor, was not supported by pro-
bative facts found where the acts in question were consistent 
with the fiduciary duties under the contract. 
[4] Trial-Findings-Ultimate and Probative Facts.-An ultimate 
finding drawn from probative facts previously found cannot 
stand if the probative facts are not susceptible of a construc-
tion that will support the judgment. 
[5] Oontracts - Modiftcation - Implied Oontract.-Before a con-
tract modifying a written contract can be implied, the conduct 
of the parties must be inconsistent with the written agreement 
so as to warrant the conclusion that tbey intended to modify 
the written contract. 
[6] Banks - Deposits - Trusts. - Both as to express trusts and 
trusts created by operation of law, an ascertainable interest 
in a bank account of the trustee in whicb the funds of the 
(1) See 23 Oal.JUT. 262; 47 Am.JUT. 748. 
[5) Evidence to establish oral modification of written contract, 
note, 94 A.L.R. 1278. See, also, 6 Oal.Jur. 375; 4 Oal.Jur. Ten-7ear 
8upp. (1943 Rev.) 164; 12 Am.Jur. 1006. 
McX. Dig. References: [1] Set-off and Counterclaim, § 85; [2, 7] 
Insurance, § 11; [3] Contracts, § 288; [4] Trial, § 333; [5] Con-
tracts, §l89; [6] Banks, i 89; [8] Agency, 1167; [9] lDsurance, 
12a. . 
) 
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trustee and of the beneficiary are deposited constitutes an 
asset definite enough to be the subject matter of a trust. The 
trust is not invalidated by the fact that the amount to be 
remitted by the trustee is a net ba]ance different from the 
amount held in trust. 
[7a, 7b] Insura.nce - Insolvency - Agent Bolding Premiums. ~ 
Where an insurance l!Jompany goes into liquidation, its ag-ent 
who holds premiums &5 trustee is not under a duty on termina-
. tion of the contracts in the liquidation proceeding to. return 
to the various insureds the excess above the earned premiums, 
but rather to remit the funds to the liquidator, as the insureds 
are entitled only to participate in the dividend payable out 
of the insolvent estate to general creditors. 
[8] Agency-Relation Between Agent and Third Person-Monq 
Received.-An action for money paid to an agent which is 
brought on the ground of a subsequent breach by the principal 
must be brought against the principal, not the agent. Such 
breach does not retroactively affect the lawfulness of the pay-
ment and its receipt by the ~ent at the time it was made. 
[9] Insurance-AgeDcy-Compensatfon.-Where the insolvency of 
an insurance company deprives an agent of commissions on 
policies written and not cancelled, he is entitled to compensa-
tion equal to the commissions as damages for the breach of 
contract. 
APPEAL from a judll'JIlent of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Benjamin C. Jones, Judge 
assigned. Reversed. 
Action by liquidator of insurance company against an agent 
for premiums collected and not turned over. Judgment 
against plaintiff and for defendant on a eross-complaint, 
reversed. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John L. Nourse, Dep-
uty Attorney General, Hester Webb and U. S. Webb for 
Appellant. 
Dunne & Dunne, Arthur B. Dunne and Elden C. Friel for 
Respondent. ... 
TRAYNOR, J.-Union IndeInnity Company, hereinafter 
called Union, a Louisiana corporation licensed to do insurance 
[8] Liability of &gent for funds received from ~d periOD, DOte, 
82 A.L.R. 307. See, also, 2 Am.Jur. 266. 
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business in this state, was declared insolvent by a Louisiana 
court on January 6, 1933, and was declared insolvent in Cali-
fornia b:v decree of the Superior Court of the City and County 
of San Francisco on January 12, 1933. The Insurance Com-
missioner was appointed liquidator in California and vested 
wHh all property rights of the company in California. It 
does not appear that Union WaR unable to meet its liabilities 
as they became due or that it ceased operations before it was 
declared insolvent, although for some time before that date, at 
least since October 1, 1932, the liabilities of the company 
exceeded its assets. Union's liquidation in Louisiana resulted 
in a dividend of less than 4 per cent. In California no divi-
dend has yet been paid. This case arises out of Union's 
relation to its general agent for California. Edward Brown 
& Sons, hereinafter called Brown. On October 1, 1931, Brown 
entered into a written agreement, guaranteed by the two 
other defendants, to act as general agent for Union. This 
agreement was modified and supplemented by another writ-
ten agreement. also effective since October 1, 1931. There 
was also a profit-sharing agreement. Following the appoint. 
ment of the liquidator in this state, defendants filed with 
him a claim for $9].74~.52. of which he allowed $25,897.97, 
rejecting the balance In ,January, 1936, defendants filed a 
petition for an ordE'r to show cause why their claim should not 
be allowed for the full amount. In the same month the plain-
tiff liquidator filed this action against the defendants to re-
cover $11.702.29 later modified to $9,7!'i7.39. allegedly repre-
senting insurance premiums co]]ected by Brown before and 
after the declaration of insolvencv and not turned over to 
Union or the Iiquidlltor. Under th~ agreements of October 1, 
1931, Brown was appointed Union's agent for the purpose 
of "procuring acceptable applications for, and collecting 
premiums" on the ~Iasses of insurance and bonds named 
in the agreements. Brown was required to adhere to the 
rates prescribed by Union and to comply with the rules and 
regulations of the company with respect to the issuance 
of policies lind bonds and "to conduct the business • • • 
strictly upon such terms, conditions and instructions as the 
Company may prescribe in its letters of instruction, or by 
letter, telegram, or telephone." Brown was to report to 
Union daily, or as soon as practicable, each policy or other 
writiDg issued and each change in the character or amount of 
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Uuion's liability. Brown had also to render to Union monthly 
accounts cO\·ering all poliries written, renewed or cancelled 
duriEg the preceuin;:; month and to remit the amount thereof 
by deposit in a cert:!ill San }<'l'ancisco banI, on the fourth day 
of the fourth month following that in which the business was 
written. The agent was respollsibJp under the agreement for 
the payment of all original ann advance premiums on bonds , 
and policies written by it. In the case of cancellatiolls it was 
allowed return premiums if no premiums had been collected. 
The agency agreement further provided: "All premiums col-
lected by the agent for the company are the property of the 
company and shall be held by the agent as a fiduciary trust 
until deliverey to the company. The privilege of deducting 
commissions which are debts due the agent, if granted, shall 
not be taken as a waiver by the company of its exclusive 
ownership of all premiums." As to termination of the agency, 
the agreement called for a sixty-day written notice by either ! 
party and empowered Union to terminate the relation in-
stantly for cause. Brown's last remittance to Union covered 
business written until the end of September, 1932. Plaintiff's 
action relates to premiums on business written after that date 
and, to a small extent, to premiums on previous business 
collected upon an audit. Defendants filed an answer denying 
any liability and setting up their claims against Union as an 
off-set and counterclaim. The trial court entered judgment 
against plaintiff and in favor of defendants on their cross-
complaint for $39,267.31, which was reduced to $24,267.31 
when a motion for a new trial was argued. Plaintiff appealed, 
and defendant filed a cross-appeal, which was not perfected. 
The matter is here on the clerk's transcript, the reporter hav-
ing died while proceedings to secure a reporter's transcript 
were pending (Caminetti v. Edward Brown & Sons, 23 Cal. 
2d 511 [144 P.2d 570].) The sole question to be determined 
is whether the findings of the trial court support the 
judgment. 
Defendants contend that the agency agreement under which 
Brown was a trustee of the premiums collected was so modi- -
fied as to make the relation of Union and Brown one of creditor 
and debtor rather than of beneficiary and trustee, and that 
this modification has been conclusively determined by the 
trial court in its findings. [1] If defandanta undertook 
- . 
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their obligations as to the remittance of premiums in a fidu-
ciary capacity, they would not be permitted to set off. per-
sonal claims: for a fiduciary cannot set off claims owed t.o him 
in his personnl cnpacity against obligations that he assumes as 
a trustee. (Bond v. City of Pasadena, 6 Ca1.2d. I3!J, 141 
[56 P.2d 946); [(aye v. Metz. 186 Cal. 42, 49 [198 P. 1047] ; 
In re lIildcbrandt, 92 Cal. 433, 436 [28 P. 486] ; Flynn v. 
Seale, 2 Cal.App. 665, 670[84 P. 263]; Libby v. II ollkins, 
104 U.S. 303 [26 L.Ed. 769); Cook County Nat. Bank v. 
United States, 107 U.S. 445, 452 [2 S.Ct. 561, 27 L.Ed. 537) ; 
Western Tie & Timber Co. v. Brown, 196 U.S. 502 [25 S.Ct. 
339,49 L.Ed. 571) ; Alvord v. Ryan, 212 F. 83, 85 [128 C .. C.A. 
539] ; Sperb v. McCoun, 110 N.Y. 605 [18 N.E. 441, 1 L.R.A. 
490] j Topas. v. Jokn MacGregor Grant, Inc., 18 F.2d 724, 
52 A.L.R. 807; see Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees; 
§ 812, p. 2354; 47 Am .• Jur., Setoff and Counterclaim, § 51.) 
[2] If defendants were trustees of the premiums collected, 
they would therefore be obligated to remit them, deducting 
only commissions earned thereon as provided in the agency 
agreement. With respect to all claims not allowed as deduc-
tions from the premiums to be remitted, they would have to 
seek satisfaction from Union's insolvent estate as general 
creditors. [3a] It must therefore be determined whether 
defendants' contention that their trusteeship established in 
the agency agreement was abolished, is sustained by the fol-
lowing finding: "At all times after October 1, 1931, to the 
knowledge of said Union Indemnity Company, and with its 
consent, all collections made by Edward Brown & Sons on 
account of premiums or otherwise, as agent of Union Indem-
nity Company or for Union Indemnity Company were depos-
ited by Edward Brown & Sons in its own bank account or 
bank accounts unsegregated from other funds • • • and all 
settlements between Edward Brown & Sons and Union Indem-
nity Company were made on a net cash basis. In respect to all 
moneys due -to Union Indemnity Company from Edward 
Brown and Sons the relation . • • was that of debtor and 
creditor and with the knowledge and consent of Union Indem-
nity Company, Edward Brown & Sons never collected or held 
any moneys paid as or for premiums on any policy of Union 
Indemnity Company as a trust fund; and, in this respect the 
contract of the parties was modified and said modification was 
fully performed ••• Prior to January 6, 1933, it was agreed 
... 
) 
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between Edward Brown & Sons and Union Indemnity Com-
pany that the relationship between Union Indemnity Com-
pany on account of premiums on its policies and bonds col-
lected by and paid to Edward Brown & Sons should be that 
only of a debtor and creditor and that Edward Brown & Sons 
should not be required to keep any moneys paid to it on 
account of premiums segregated or as trust funds or as fidu-
eiary funds and that the only obligation or duty of Edward 
Brown & Sons in respect to any money so received should be a 
personal obligation to pay monthly to Union Indemnity Com-
pany the balance, if any, due after allowing credit to Edward 
Brown & Sons for funds expended by it on behalf of Union 
Indemnity Company, including return premiums paid on 
account of cancellationS, and, on January 6, 1933, said agree-
ment was fully performed.~' 
This finding includes the finding of certain probative facts 
and the conclusion that these facts are sufficient under the 
law to create a contract. (See Baumgartner v. United States, 
322 U.S. 665 [64 S.Ct. 1240, 1243, 88 L.Ed 1525]; Holmes, 
The Common Law, 115; Green, Mixed Q1UStions of Law and 
Fact, 15 Harv.L.Rev. 271, 272; Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: 
The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 Harv.L.Rev. 753,822.) 
[4] "It is, of course, well settled that a general and ultimate 
finding . . • which is drawn as a conclusion from facts pre-
viously found, cannot stand if· the specific facts upon which 
it is based do not support it" (McKay v. Gesford, 163 Cal. 
243, 246 [124 P. 1016, Ann.Cas. 1913E 1253, 41 L.R.A.N.S. 
303J) that if, if the probative facts are not susceptible of a 
eonstruction that will support the judgment. (Quinn v. 
Rosenfeld, 15 Cal.2d 486, 491 [102 P.2d 317) ; Matter of For-
rester, 162 Cal. 493, 495 [123 P. 283] ; People v. McCue, 150 
Cal: 195,198 [88 P. 899J; Hammond Lbr. Co. v. Barth Invest. 
Corp., 202 Cal. 606, 609 [262 P. 31]; Loud v. Lwe, 214 Cal. 
10, 12 [3 P.2d 542]; Fitzpatrick v. Underwood, 17 Ca1.2d 
722, 727 [112 P.2d 3].) 
[Sb] Nowhere in its findings has the trial court included 
probative facts that would indicate that Union and Brown ... 
ever modified the agency agreement by an express contract 
substituting a creditor and debtor relationship for the fidu-
eiary relationship contemplated by the agency agreement. 
There is no reference to any writing or to any circumstances 
I ~ , 
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under which any other express contract might have been made 
between the parties. The probative facts that are statrd in 
the finding, namely, that with the knowledge and COllsent of 
Union, Brown deposited all money collected on behalf of 
Union ill its own bank account or bank accounts unsegrcgatrd 
from other funds, and that all settlements betwerll BrO\\"ll 
and Union were made on a net cash basi!';, relate to the cOlldnrt 
of Brown in performing the contract. When the finding is 
read as a whole and in connection with defendant's answer to 
the complaint· (Zeibak v. Nasser, 12 Ca1.2d 1, 15 [82 P.2d 
375] ; Kohner v. National Surety Co., 105 Cal.App. 430, 440 
[287 P. 510]; Dam v. Zink, 112 Cal. 91, 93 [44 P. 331]), it 
is clear that the agreement therein referred to was an implied 
contract. It must therefore be determined whether the pro-
bative facts are susceptible of a construction that will support 
the finding of an implied contract. [6] Before a contract 
modifying a written contract can be implied, the conduct of 
the parties according to the findings of the trial court must be 
inconsistent with the written contract so as to warrant the 
conclusion that the parties intended to modify the written 
contract. (Columbia Oasualty Co. v. Lewis, 14 Cal.App.2d 
64,72 [57 P.2d 1010] ; Harbor Const. 00. v. Walters, 101 Cal. 
App. 470, 478 [281 P. 1062].) [30] The fact that the set-
tlements between Brown and Union were made on a net cash 
basis does not warrant the conclusion that the parties intended 
to modify the agency agreement, for the settlements were in 
accord with the provisions of that agreement that remittance 
·Paragraph VII of defendants' answer alleged : "At all times men· 
tioned in the complaint and herein during which EDW.A.RD BROWN & 
SONS acted as agent in respect to Union Indemnity Company under 
the, agreement Exhibit 'A' (Original Agency Agreement) to the com· 
plaint, it acted as such and under said agreement only as the same is 
modified by Exhibit <A' hereto and as modified (among other respects) 
as next hereinafter stated, that is to say: 
"At all times after October 1, 1931, to the knowledge. of Union In· 
demnity Company and with its consent all collections on account of pre-
miums made by EDW.A.RD BROWN & SONS were deposited by ED-
W.A.RD BROWN & SONS in its own account or accounts and the same 
were not kept segregated, and all settlements between EDWARD BROWN 
& SONS and Union Indemnity Company were made on a net cash basis, 
and at all of said times in respect of all moneys due to Union Indem-
nity Company by agreement of EDW.A.RD BROWN & SONS and Union 
Indemnity Company the relationship between EDW.A.RD BROWN & 
SONS and Union Indemnity Company as to any moneys due to Union 
Indemnity Company from EDWARD BROWN & SONS was that of 
c1ebtor and creditor. The relationship aDd modification as aforesaid .... 
aDd baa bee fully performed." 
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by the agent was to be made on the basis of business written 
after credit for concellations with "the privilege> or de>r1uct-
ing commissions which are debts due the agC'nt" which "if 
granted, shall not be taken as a waiver by the company of its 
exclusive ownership of all premiums." The> depositing b~' 
Brown with Union's knowledge and consent of all collected 
premiums in Brown's own bank account llmro;.:rC'gated from 
Brown's ovm funds was also consistent with Drown's fiduciary 
duties under the agency. agreement. [6] It is settled as to 
both express trusts. and trusts creat<'(1 h~' operation of law 
that an ascertainable interest in a ballk aec-ount of the trustee 
in which funds of the trustee and of the beneficiary are de-
posited constitutes an asset definite enough to be the subject 
matter of a trust. (Co1"ley v. Hennessy, 58 Cal.App.2d 883, 
885 [137 P.2d 857] : Kobida v. Hinkclmann. 53 Cal.App.2d 
186, 193 [127 P.2d 657] ; Mitchell v. Dunn, 211 Cal. 12!), 136 
[294 P. 386] ; Koble v. ;\'oble, 198 Cal. 120. 134 [243 P. 439, 
43 A.L.R. 1235] ; Estate of Arms, 186 Ca1. 554, 562 [199 P. 
1053]; Elizalde v. Elizalde, 137 Cal. 634, 635, 641 [66 P. 36!), 
70 P. 861].) The fact that the amount to be remitted by de-
fendants was a net balance different from the amount held in 
trust did not invalidate the trust, for funds may be held in 
trust to secure payment of an amount different from the total 
of the trust funds. The written agency agreement must there-
fore be regarded as controlling, for written contracts cannot 
be set aside and implied agreements substituted therefor if 
the conduct of the parties was not clearly contrary to the 
terms of the written contract. (Columbia Casualty Co. v. 
Lewis, 14 Cal.App.2d 64, 72 [57 P.2d 1010]; Houghton v. 
Lawton, 63 Ca1.App. 218, 223 [218 P. 475) ; see 4 Cal.Jur. 
Ten-year Supp. (1943 Rev.) 164; 94 A.L.R. 1278.) Since 
the probative facts on which the ultimate finding is based is 
not susceptible of the construction that there was an implied 
agreement modifying the written contract, they do not sup-
port the trial court's finding that there was an implied agree-
ment. 
[7a] Defendants also contend that plaintiff's claim is de- .. 
feated by the following finding: "It is true that prior to 
January 6, 1933 defendant Edward Brown & Sons received 
moneys ••• as and for premiums • • . written in the months 
of October through December 1932, inclusive. It is not true 
that after deducing therefrom all return premiUJll8 on .... ...:J._ I· y.....-
f 
) 
/ 
) 
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des and/or bonds cancelled prior to January 6, 1933, and 
all commissions earned thereon, defandant Edward Brown 
held or still holds any sum belonging to Union Indemnity 
Company or owned by plaintiff herein or owed or owes Union 
Indemnity Company or plaintiff herein any sum or that said 
defendant, after January 6, 1933, or now, holds or held any 
money or thing belonging to Union Indemnity Company or 
plaintiff or owes any sum to Union Indemnity Company or 
plaintiff. After January 12, 1933, defendant Edward Brown 
& Sons received money which was the equivalent of a portion 
of premiums on policies and bonds in effect on January 6, 
1933. It is not true that after deducting therefrom all com-
missions earned, Edward Brown & Sons holds any sum which 
was the property of Union Indemnity Company or any BUm 
which is now vested in or owned by plaintiff or owed or owes 
Union Indemnity Company or plaintiff any sum •.. Any and 
all sums collected by Edward Brown & Sons for or on behalf 
of Union Indemnity Company and any and all sums at any 
time due from Edward Brown & Sons to Union Indemnity 
were paid by Edward Brown & Sons to Union Indemnity 
Company .... " 
Even if it is assumed that this is a finding of fact rather 
than a conclusion of law, it must be read in conjunction with 
finding XVII, defining unearned premiums and excluding 
such premiums from Union's claims against Brown, and it is 
then clearly apparent that the court found that Union was 
entitled only to the "earned portion" of the premiums, namely 
that portion covering the period ending January 6, 1933. The 
hasis of this finding is that Union had no right to remittance 
by the agent of any portion of the premiums paid by the in-
sured to Brown allocable to the time after Union ceased to do 
business. In passing upon plaintiff's motion for a new trial, 
the trial court stated that the case was decided on the theory 
that when Union went into liquidation in Louisiana the funds 
in the hands of Brown "were frozen, and that it was his duty 
upon th(' termination of the contracts in the liquidation pro-
ceedings to return the money to the various insureds. over 
and above the amount of the earned premiums." This theory 
is erroneous. It is not supported by section 2344 of the Civil 
Code providing: "If an agent receives anything for the bene-
fit of his principal, to the possession of which another person 
is entitlrd. h(' must, on demand, surrender it to BUch person, or 
as c.24-&6 
) 
-
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so much of it as he has under his control at the time of demand, 
on being indemnified for any advance which he h~s made 
to his principal, in good faith, on account of the Sllme; and is 
responsible therefor, if, after notice from the towner, he deliv-
ers it to his principal." This rule entitles one who has paid 
money through fraud or mistake to an innocent agent to re-
cover from him, unless the agent has turned oye;' the money 
to his principal or otherwise changed Ms position. (Weiner 
Y. Roof, 19 Ca1.2d 748, 752 [122 P.2d 896).) In the present 
ease, however, the insured sought to re('over back premiums 
on the ground not of fraud or mistake. but of the breach of 
contract that Union committed when it allowed itself to be 
declared insolvent. (Caminetti v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
23 Ca1.2d 94, 102 [142 P.2d 74] 1 : see Federico M. Mfg. Co. 
v. Great Western F.Ins. Co .. 173 La. 90!,) P3D SO. ],79 A.L.R. 
1256].) There was no breach until Union was declared insol-
vent. Until that time Pnion functioned as an insurance com-
pany, covering losses of its insureds. Only upon the entry of 
the order directing its liquidation did Union's liabilities to-
ward its creditors and claims against its debtors become fixed. 
(2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1931. Act. 3739, § 4.) [8] A suit to 
recover money paid to an agent upon the ground that the con-
tract was subsequently breached by the principal must be 
brought against the principal and not against the agent. The 
alleged breach of contract does not retroactively affect the 
lawfulness of the payment and its receipt by the agent at the 
time when it was made. (Blea11 v. Wright, 110 Mich. 183 
[68 N.W. 115]; Pinnegan v. Geoghegan, 111 N.Y.S. 656; 
Tripple v. Littlefield, 46 Wash. 156 [89 P. 493] ; Cooper v. 
Tim, 16 Misc. 372 r38 KY.S. 67J: Hnffman v.Newman, 55 
Neb. 713 [76 N.W. 409: ll'right v. Merritt Realty Co., 148 
Wash. 380 [268 P. 873] : Bank of United States v. Bank of 
Washington, 6 Pet. (3] U.S.)8, 17 [8 L.Ed. 2991 ; see 3 C.J.S. 
128; 2 Am.Jur., Agency, ~ 340; 23 L.R.A.N.S. 558; 1 Mechem 
on Agency, (2d ed.), § 1482. p. 1102; 82 A.L.R. 307; ct. Pan-
coast v. Dinsmore, 105 Me. 471 r75 A. 43, 134 Am.St.Rep ...... 
582]; Cassimus v. Vaughn Realty Co .. 217 Ala. 561 f117 So. 
180J; Smith v. Binder, 75 Ill. 492.) [7b] Moreover, a claim 
under section 2344 against the agent is limited to what the 
claimant is entitled to demand from the principal. Since 
Union became insoh'ent, the insureds were entitled to par-
~te onq·m the dividend payable out of the insolv8Ilt 
) 
/ 
) 
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estate to general creditors. This court Mllld, not recognize 
a ehdm for full sntiRraction b~l the agent to whom the premium 
was paid without creating a preferential right for those in-
sureds who happened to pny their premiums to an agent at 
the expensC' of all otl1(:'T creditorR, includin~ tIle other insureds. 
The creation of su('h 1\ prcfl'rential right would go be-
yond the purpose of section 2344. which is to avoid cir. 
cuity of action rather t.han to enlarge the scope of the recovery 
to which the claimant is entitled against the principal. After 
the appointment of a liquidator, who may take possession of 
all assets of the insolvent insurance company, it was the duty 
of the agent to remit funds in his hands to the liquidator for 
the purposes of liquidation. 
[9] The question remains whether defendants' claim for 
compensation for servicers rendered from October 1, 1932, to 
January 12, 1933, which forms one of the items of the com· 
putation in question, should be upheld. The trial court found 
that the reasonable value of such services, which were not 
compensated, was in excess of $20,000. The services include 
Brown's activities relative to the writing of policies before 
Union was declared insolvent, for which Brown did not obtain 
the commissions due because Union's insolvency intervened. 
Other uncompensted services relate to policies cancelled by 
the insureds before Union was declared insolvent, cancella. 
tions which defendants claim occurred. not in the ordinary 
course of business. but because Union's financial status was 
already disrupted. The question whether compensation is 
owed for these services is a question of law. Insolvency of 
an insurance company is as much a creach of contract with 
the agents as with thE' insureds. (See Caminetti v. Pacific 
M1dual Lile In.~. Co .. supra.) In so far as Brown was de-
prived by Union's insolvency of commissions for policies writ-
ten and not cancened. Brown is entitled to compensation equal 
to the commissions afo; damages for the breach of contract com-
mitted by Union. Reco/!Tlition of this claim does not include 
the recognition of any claim of the agent ba.c;ed on the loss of 
business for the time after Union's insolvency. No such claim 
is submitted on this appeal. There was. hmvever, no breach 
of contract on the part of Union 8S to policie!'! and bonds 
alread~' cancelled when Union was declared insolvent. Brown 
assumed the risk under the agenc~' agreement of losing com-
pensation because of cancellations. 
.... 
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Plaintifi' has attacked as unintelligIole the finding contain-
ing the computation of the claims of the parties. Since we do 
not approve the theories of the trial court underlying this 
computation, it would serve no useful purpose to inquire into 
the inteJJigibility of the finding, for it wm not stand in the 
way of the trial court upon the retrial of the ease. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C.J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., eon-
enned. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. This is a judgment roll appeal. 
We do not know what evidence was before the trial court. As 
shown in the findings of fact (quoted more fully in the major-
ity opinion) the trial court found, among other things, that 
"Prior to January 6, 1933. it was agreed between Edward 
Brown & Sons and Union Indemnity Company that the rela-
tionship between Union Indemnity Company on account of 
premiums on its policies and bonds collected by and paid to 
Edward Brown & Sons should be that only of a debtor and 
creditor and that ... the only obligation or duty of Edward 
Brown & Sons in respect of any money so received should be 
a personal obligation to pay monthly to Union Indemnity 
Company the balance. if any. due after anowing credit to 
Edward Brown & Sons for funds expended by it on behalf 
of Union Indemnity Comnany. including return premiums 
paid on account of cancellations. and, on January 6. 1933 
said agreement was fu1J~' performed." 
The above quoted finding. standing alone, fully supports 
the judgment in so far as concerns that phase of the ease upon 
which the majority opinion bases the reversal. To escape or 
overcome the effect of this finding of ultimate facts the major-
ity opinion relies UDon the proposition that (a) certain pro-
bative facts were found which. it holds do not necessarily 
establish such ultimate facts and that (b) the findings do not 
set forth other nrobative fact." which would establish such 
ultimate facts. From that proposition the inference is drawn, 
or presumption indul/!ed. in favor of reversing the .1udgment, 
that no evidence was produced suffic:>ient to support the finding 
of ultimate facts. I do not find such inference or presump-
tion tenable upon the record before us. 
It has been sound and long-established law, which 1 deplore 
/ 
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!>eeing disturbed, that "In reviewing the sufficiency of the 
finding!' to support "the judgment, regard will bc had to the 
ultimate facts found, and not to mere probative facts, which 
are not shown by the findings to be the only facts proved, and 
from which alone the court finds the ultimate facts. In the 
absence of such showing, the mere circumstance that some of 
the prohative fact" are inconsistent with the ultimate facts 
will not prevent the ultimate fact!> from controlling" (2 Cal. 
JUT. 872-873. ~ 511) and "an appellate court in reviewing the 
findings will give them a liberal construction in support of 
the judgment." (ld., p. 871.) 
Here; the probative findings on which the majority relies 
to overcome the finding of ultimate facts are inadequate to 
that end. They may be insufficient in themselves to estab-
lish the ultimate fa~ts but they are not inconsistent with them 
and do not preclude the existence of evidence which would 
support the finding of nlHmate facts. "Any uncertaintieR 
in the findings ar(' to receive such construction as will uphold 
rather than defeat the judgment" (2 Cal.JUT. 871. ~ 511) 
and upon a hldgnlPnt roll appeal it will be presumed that 
competent evidence sufficient to sustain the findings was re-
ceived without objection and "that there was no evidence 
before the conrt which in any l'espeC't rille lified or limited the 
effect of th(' findin!!'S" (2 Ca1..Tur. 877-878. & 514.) See. also, 
Carpenter v. Pr()loff (1!l3!lL ::l0 Cal.App.2d 400. 407 r86 P.2d 
fWJl : ~Wes v. Rodkin (H141 L 43 CAl.App.2d 839. 840 fln 
p.2o 6751: Lamanct v. Lamanet (1937)' 18 Cal.App.2d 402, 
40S r63 P.2il J19!'il : Whifnc1/ v. Redfern (1940),41 Cal.App. 
2il 409. 413 nOll P.2il 9191. 
In the last cit('il ('flse it was held that "Upon an appeal on 
the judgment roll alone. only the ultimate fact" found by the 
court. not the probative facts which have no proper place in 
the findings. can be considered. and it is only in those cases 
where it clearly appears that the ultimate fact found is based 
upon and edduced from the findings of probative facts. and 
it is plain that the latter do not justify nor support the ulti-
mate fact found. that the findings of probative facts will con-.... 
thor that of the ultimate fact. and so deprive the judgment of 
support " 
In Perry v. Quackenbush (1894) 105 Cal. 299, 305 P. 
7401, this court held that "Findings of probative facts will 
not, in general, control, limit, or modi4 the findings of the 
-) 
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u It.imate fact. The province of the trial court is to find the 
ultimate facts, not prohative facts. If, from a consider-
atioll of the probative facts, this court should determine that 
th~y aid not justify tIle finding of the ultimate fact it would 
determine that the evidclJc{' was insnfficient to justify the 
decision. This, it lias been repeatedly held, cannot be done 
in this mode." (See, also. Breeze v. Tnternational Banking 
Curl). (1914), 25 Cal.App. 437, 443 [143 P. 10G6] ; Pio Pico 
v. Cuyas (1873),47 Cal. 174, 178.) 
The finding of ultimate facts in the record here appears 
to fully support the judgment. Since the findings do not 
preclude the existence of evidence to support the ultimate 
facts and do not establish probative facts which are essen-
tially inconsistent with the ultimate facts found it seems to 
me that consideration for sound administration of justice de-
mands that we affirm the judgment. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
22,1945. Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., alia Spellce, J., voted for 
a rehearing. 
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